The war rages about cities with names such as Goa and Timbuktu, in a
sparsely populated, mostly flat, dusty and landlocked country in
northwest Africa.
The combatants include a nomadic Berber people known as
Tuareg, the French Foreign Legion and a coalition of al Qaida affiliates
who identify themselves with the Maghreb, the desert region of
Northwestern Africa.
It sounds as if it could be the plot for a
new Indiana Jones adventure. But those who study international terrorism
say it would be a mistake for Americans to think of this conflict as
anything but deadly serious. The war in Mali is the new front in the war
on international terrorism.
Some U.S. officials have downplayed the threat, noting in
congressional testimony that those involved in Mali don’t appear capable
of striking outside West and North Africa.
But in some ways,
what’s happening in Mali reminds experts of events in another
little-known, faraway land in the latter half of the 1990s: Afghanistan.
Back then, a fledgling al Qaida, though already a known threat, was
using remote terrain to train a generation of elite terrorist fighters.
The threat of those fighters was that once trained, they were
disappearing to await plans and opportunities to strike at the hated
West.
“When we look back at Afghanistan, we wonder if we could have stopped what was to come,” said Daniel Byman, a national security and terrorism expert at Georgetown University who served as a staff member of the 9/11Commission.
J.
Peter Pham, a terrorism expert at the Atlantic Council research center,
with particular emphasis on central Africa, notes that despite the
continued focus of much of the resources of America’s anti-terrorism
efforts on central Asia, the potential threat in Mali should look
familiar.
“Jihadists aren’t wedded to any one place over another,”
he said. “They go to where the fight is. For the past year, northern
Mali has been the place.”
The Islamists rolled over their
opposition. Mali’s U.S.-trained army, which staged a coup in March to
protest a lack of government support in the fight to regain control of
the north, was almost wholly ineffective. An international force of
regional African troops approved by the United Nations – but not funded –
existed in resolutions only.